SpeechbyMr.RobertHodgkinson,ICAEWExecutiveDirectorontheThirdCPAForumofChina
2006-06-02 05:48
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON ACCOUNTING FIRMS
Speech by Mr. Robert Hodgkinson,ICAEW Executive Director, Technical Presentation on the Third CPA Forum of China
Beijing, 29 May, 2006 Introduction I want to invite you to think about how the governance of accounting firms might evolve in China in the future. I will do this by describing the experience of the profession, mainly in the UK and the European Union (EU), over the past 5 years. Major changes in how accounting firms are expected to report publicly on their activities have helped to drive major changes in the governance of firms. The governance challenge facing accounting firms In 2002 because of US corporate scandals, the UK government set up a review of the accounting profession by the Co-ordinating Group on Accounting and Auditing Issues (the CGAA). My institute - the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) - was represented on the CGAA through its President, Peter Wyman. The report of the CGAA issued in January 2003 noted that the right of accounting firms to act as company auditors is based on the public having confidence that firms are able to conduct effective and independent audits. In addition, the ability of firms to perform high quality independent audits depends in large part on matters that are internal to the accounting firms including their culture, procedures, safeguards and reward systems. The standards expected of firms in terms of quality control processes and systems had been established through the work of the UK Auditing Practices Board in its auditing standard on quality control. However, the review noted that historically there had been little publicly available information on firms'' structures, processes and financial position. It therefore concluded that greater transparency was needed in order to improve public confidence in the audit work performed by accounting firms. In my view the challenge facing UK accounting firms and the solution proposed by the CGAA are relevant in other countries and are just as relevant today as in 2003. The need for a positive but proportionate response There are clear international expectations regarding how accounting firms will ensure that they perform quality audit work. They are set out in the International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC1) issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (the IAASB). The standard identifies the elements of a system of quality control including leadership responsibilities for quality, ethical requirements, client acceptance and continuance, human resources, engagement performance and monitoring. There are strong arguments for accounting firms to commit not just to compliance with a quality control standard but also to transparency about how such standards are applied and about other issues related to the governance of a firm. Auditors should readily understand the arguments for such transparency because they are the same arguments that are used to explain the publication of the financial statements that auditors are required to audit. Any management team needs information in order run a business. However, where a management team''s ability to run a business depends on earning and maintaining the trust of other stakeholders, then management should also provide information to those stakeholders. The most obvious example of this is where there is a separation of ownership and control. When the owners of a company delegate the running of a company to a management team, they expect to receive information on how the management team is discharging its responsibility to look after the interests of owners. Agency theory is used to describe such situations and owners are referred to as principals whilst managers are seen as their agents. The provision of information by agents to principals addresses the fundamental problem of "information asymmetry" which refers to the fact that agents have access to more and better information than principals. However, agency theory also recognises that even where agents are required to provide information to principals, there is a risk that the information will be biased because agents may have an interest in not reporting bad news. This is the economic reason for the independent audit of financial statements. These matters are discussed more fully in the paper "Agency theory and the role of audit" published by the ICAEW in December 2005. By expressing an independent opinion on the information provided by management to owners, independent auditors can reassure owners that the information is objective and will enable them to judge how managers are discharging their responsibilities. The same arguments apply to auditors themselves. If the investing public is to trust accounting firms with the right to perform audits, then audit firms should expect to provide the investing public with information on how they are discharging their responsibilities. They should also expect such information to be subject to independent scrutiny either by regulators or other auditors. Nevertheless, the case for agents providing independently assured information to principals is an economic one. Therefore there is a need for proportionality and good sense. The nature and extent of the information and assurance that are provided need to be proportionate to the resulting increase in confidence and economic activity. There should be no requirement to provide extra information or assurance if experienced commentators believe that the costs would exceed the benefits. In the context of disclosure by accounting firms, this means that there should be differences in the information provided by firms depending on the nature and economic significance of the businesses that they audit. Areas for better information Information about accounting firms can take many forms. Some are quite specific to the audit environment. For example:
Audit firms can also report the same type of information that other organisations with public accountability would be expected to publish, such as:
The benefits of changes Many of these suggestions for better information would have appeared unthinkable only a few years ago. However, they can bring real benefits not just to society at large (because they increase confidence in external audit) but also to individual firms. For example:
In short, transparency reinforces the profession''s credibilty and reputation for integrity. Competition in the audit market can also be improved if better information is available to buyers of audit services, such as audit committee members. Examples and experience from the UK and the EU The types of disclosure that I have referred to are already no longer dreams but reality and the recently approved EU revised 8th Directive on Statutory Audit contains provisions requiring all 25 Member States to introduce requirements for:
In the United States, the emphasis of the reforms in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was on public register information and public reports on inspections of audit firms by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). However, EU reforms go much further than in the US in relation to transparency reporting. In the UK, a public register of auditors has existed for many years and transparency reporting is also not new. The final CGAA report in January 2003 endorsed a voluntary approach to disclosure whereby 12 leading firms that audited the overwhelming majority of listed entities agreed to disclose:
In addition, in 2003 many audit firms were turning themselves into limited liability partnerships (LLPs) that were required to publish audited financial statements which complied with UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. All 12 firms committed to publish financial statements which met the legal reporting requirements for LLPs in accordance with the relevant Statement of Recommended Practice (the LLP SORP) and also committed to prepare an Operating and Financial Review (or management commentary) in accordance with the UK Accounting Standards Board''s planned standard. The overall impact of the culture of transparency is illustrated by the latest annual reports of the major UK accounting firms which are comparable to those of any large UK listed company. For example, the September 2005 UK Annual Report of KPMG LLP contains:
Potential pitfalls I wouldn''t expect this audience to accept what I have just described as a perfect vision of an inevitable future that awaits all accounting firms around the world including China. As accountants it is right that we should ask questions:
Summary To summarise:
Future actions I know that you are working hard to develop and strengthen the accounting profession in China and that there are many priorities. The ICAEW is committed to working with the accounting profession in China and recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the CICPA to train CPAs as ICAEW Chartered Accountants. Today I want to invite you to think about how the governance of accounting firms might evolve in China in the future. Accounting firms outside China have followed the standards of transparency set by the wider business community. However, in China you have the opportunity to show leadership and set an example for the whole economy. |