英文目录

2016年第6期英文摘要

Prospect of the Accountancy Profession

Mr. Andrew Ratcliffe, President of ICAEW, stated that the accountancy profession has been the cornerstone of a nation’s sustainable economic development and the key to ensure integrity and transparency in business management. The prerequisite to enhance the development of accountancy profession in a country is to strengthen its professional organizations. In order to keep abreast of technological progress and meet market demands, the accountancy profession must ensure its professional skills match the demands of the current digital era and are able to make continuous innovations. However, it is not enough to master technical knowledge only. Consumers, companies and governments look forward to a more proactive accountancy profession to establish better cooperative relations under which their environment and needs will be recognized and understood. Therefore, the accountancy profession should comply with a set of unified code of ethics, define its responsibilities and obligations, and satisfy its clients with high quality services.

EVA Evaluation, Investment Efficiency and Value Lifting of Listed Companies

With the listed companies in the A-share market on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2014 as sample of its empirical analysis, this article verifies the impact of investment efficiency on lifting the value of listed companies through economic value-added (EVA) evaluation and further analyzes this specific role from the perspective of investment decisions by the management of listed companies. The empirical analysis shows that the EVA evaluation mechanism can effectively lift the value of listed companies. This in-depth research finds that it works mainly through curbing the excessive investments by companies.

Influence of Minority Shareholders’ Dissent on Successor Auditor’s Opinions in the Context of Auditor Rotations through Bidding

Usually, when minority shareholders expressed their abstaining or opposing opinions for proposals made by China’s listed companies, they will not change the outcomes of the negotiations on these proposals. However, from another point of view, the dissent expressed by minority shareholders indicates frictions between the minority and majority shareholders, which may impact other market players. This article empirically analyzes the voting results of minority shareholders on auditor rotations through biddings made in China’s 1006 listed companies from 1998 to 2013 and finds that for those listed companies which received non-standard audit opinions before auditor rotations, the dissent of minority shareholders for the voting on auditor rotation clearly increased the probability that the company would continue to receive non-standard audit opinions after changing the auditors.